Property Rights, Political Connections, and Corporate Investment

Oligarchic Property Rights and Investment

We consider a dynamic model of an economy where productive capital can be owned only by the members of an elite oligarchy, because property rights and contracts are effectively enforced only by their private political networks. This private protection entails a degree of ownership security that is good but not perfect. We find that the performance of the economy will depend critically on oligar...

Political Connections and Investment in Rural Vietnam

This paper uses household panel data from rural Vietnam to explore the effects of having a relative in a position of political or bureaucratic power on farmers’ agricultural investment decisions. Our main result is that households significantly increase their investment in land improvement as a result of relatives moving into public office. Connections to office holders appear to be important f...

Property Rights Protection, Corporate Transparency, and Growth*

In countries with secure property rights, corporate transparency improves investment efficiency and increases growth by alleviating information asymmetry. However, in countries with insecure property rights, greater transparency can increase the risk of government expropriation. Therefore, some firms that would benefit most from transparency cannot take full advantage of it, as they set sub-opt...

Intellectual Property Rights and Foreign Direct Investment

Adelaide to strengthen teaching and research in the field of international economics and closely related disciplines. Its specific objectives are: • to promote individual and group research by scholars within and outside the University of Adelaide • to strengthen undergraduate and postgraduate education in this field • to provide shorter training programs in Australia and elsewhere • to conduct...

Peruvian Political Theatre and its Connections to Human Rights Movements