Propensities and conditional probabilities

Propensities and conditional probabilities

The present paper deals with the objection that Paul Humphreys raised against the propensity interpretation of probability "Humphreys' paradox". An update on existing solutions is o ered, and it is concluded that none of them is completely satisfactory in view of Humphreys' 2004 rejoinder. Positively, an original solution is formulated and discussed.

Propensities and probabilities

Popper’s introduction of ‘‘propensity’’ was intended to provide a solid conceptual foundation for objective single-case probabilities. By considering the partly opposed contributions of Humphreys and Miller and Salmon, it is argued that when properly understood, propensities can in fact be understood as objective single-case causal probabilities of transitions between concrete events. The chief...

Probabilities of Conditionals and Conditional Probabilities Ii

A dams's thesis about indicative conditionals is that their assertIlability goes by the conditional subjective probability of the consequent given the antecedent, in very much the same way that assertability normally goes by the subjective probability of truth.' The thesis is well established; the remaining question is how it may best be explained. The nicest explanation would be that the truth...

Quantum Conditional Probabilities Are Not Probabilities of Quantum Conditional

Conditionals, Conditional Probabilities, and Conditionalization

Philosophers investigating the interpretation and use of conditional sentences have long been intrigued by the intuitive correspondence between the probability of a conditional ‘if A, then C’ and the conditional probability of C, given A. Attempts to account for this intuition within a general probabilistic theory of belief, meaning and use have been plagued by a danger of trivialization, which...