Product Market Competition, Managerial Incentives and Firm Valuation
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: European Financial Management
سال: 2009
ISSN: 1354-7798
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-036x.2009.00505.x