Product market competition, incentives and fraudulent behavior
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Managerial Incentives and Financial Signaling in Product Market Competition*
This paper demonstrates how management compensation schemes can serve as an inexpensive and sometimes even free signaling mechanism. In the particular example studied here it is shown how a contract offered to the manager of a monopolistic tirm may induce him to take some actions that will credibly signal the Crm’s marginal cost and will deter entry if the firm is ‘suficiently’ ellicient. This ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economics Letters
سال: 2010
ISSN: 0165-1765
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2010.01.024