منابع مشابه
Procurement Design with Corruption
This paper investigates the design of optimal procurement mechanisms in the presence of corruption. After the sponsor and the contractor sign the contract, the latter may bribe the inspector to misrepresent quality. Thus, the mechanism affects whether bribery occurs. I show how to include bribery as an additional constraint in the optimal-control problem that the sponsor solves, and characteriz...
متن کاملProcurement and process design
The project cycle ................................................................................................ 1 Project delivery ................................................................................................... 2 Design-Bid-Build................................................................................................. 3 Quality-based selection in design-build.........
متن کاملProcurement and Renegotiation
Parties bound by an incomplete contract have an incentive to renegotiate after acquiring new information. The issue of the parties' investment in the relationship before renegotiation is analyzed in a simple two-period procurement model. The firm invests in the first period. It then learns its production cost and the sponsor learns its value for the project. Williamson' s underinvestment presum...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: European Journal of Hospital Pharmacy
سال: 2019
ISSN: 2047-9956,2047-9964
DOI: 10.1136/ejhpharm-2018-001822