PROCUREMENT ACTIVITIES OF ECONOMIC ENTITIES IN THE MARKET ECONOMY
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: MIR [World] (Modernization Innovation Research)
سال: 2016
ISSN: 2411-796X,2079-4665
DOI: 10.18184/2079-4665.2016.7.3.137.141