Probability, coherent belief and coherent belief changes

Coherent Belief Revision in Games

Probability, rational belief and belief change

A simple model of rational belief holds that: (i) an instantaneous snapshot of an ideally rational belief system corresponds to a probability distribution; and (ii) rational belief change occurs by Bayesian conditionalization. But a priori probability distributions of the Kolmogorov sort cannot distinguish between propositions that are simply true from propositions that are necessarily true. Fu...

Coherent Frames

Frames which can be generated by the action of some operators (e.g. translation, dilation, modulation, ...) on a single element $f$ in a Hilbert space, called coherent frames. In this paper, we introduce a class of continuous frames in a Hilbert space $mathcal{H}$ which is indexed by some locally compact group $G$, equipped with its left Haar measure. These frames are obtained as the orbits of ...

Uncertainty, Belief, and Probability

We introduce a new probabilistic approach to dealing with uncertainty, based on the observation that probability theory does not require that every event be assigned a probability. For a nonmeasurable event (one to which we do not assign a probability), we can talk about only the inner measure and outer measure of the event. Thus, the measure of belief in an event can be represented by an inter...

Update, Probability, Knowledge and Belief

The paper compares two kinds of models for logics of knowledge and belief, neighbourhood models and epistemic weight models. We give sound and complete calculi for both, and we show that our calculus for neighbourhood models is sound but not complete for epistemic weight models. Epistemic weight models combine knowledge and probability by using epistemic accessibility relations and weights to d...