Probabilistic participation in public goods games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Probabilistic participation in public goods games.
Voluntary participation in public goods games (PGGs) has turned out to be a simple but effective mechanism for promoting cooperation under full anonymity. Voluntary participation allows individuals to adopt a risk-aversion strategy, termed loner. A loner refuses to participate in unpromising public enterprises and instead relies on a small but fixed pay-off. This system leads to a cyclic domina...
متن کاملCommitment and Participation in Public Goods Games
The Anh Han School of Computing, Teesside University, Borough Road, Middlesbrough, TS1 3BA, UK [email protected] Luís Moniz Pereira NOVA LINCS, Departamento de Informática, Faculdade de Ciências e Tecnologia, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, 2829-516 Caparica, Portugal [email protected] Tom Lenaerts MLG, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Boulevard du Triomphe CP212, 1050 Brussels, Belgium AI lab, Vrije Un...
متن کاملPublic Goods Games
Centralized sanctioning institutions are of utmost importance for overcoming free-riding tendencies and enforcing outcomes that maximize group welfare in social dilemma situations. However, little is known about how such institutions come into existence. In this paper we investigate, both theoretically and experimentally, the endogenous formation of institutions in a public goods game. Our theo...
متن کاملEquilibrium Participation in Public Goods Allocations
We consider a notion of voluntary participation for mechanism design in public goods economies in which mechanisms select public goods allocations and individuals then choose whether or not to submit their requested transfer to the central planner. The set of allocations that are robust to non-participation is shown to be sub-optimal in a wide variety of environments and may shrink to the endow...
متن کاملBinary Participation in Public Goods Allocations
An environment is studied in which mechanisms suggest public goods allocations and individuals then choose whether or not to submit their requested transfer to the central planner. The set of allocations such that unanimous participation is an equilibrium is shown to be sub-optimal in a wide variety of environments and shrinks to the endowment as the economy is replicated. Optimal public goods ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
سال: 2007
ISSN: 0962-8452,1471-2954
DOI: 10.1098/rspb.2007.0673