Privatization, Information and Incentives
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Privatization Under Incomplete Information and Bankruptcy Risk
We study privatization under moral hazard and adverse selection. We show that if the fraction of efficient investors is either insignificant or productivity differences between efficient and inefficient investors are negligible, the government would offer a pooling contract and sell the same fraction of equity to both types of investors. The lower the productivity difference, the greater the eq...
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Many interesting and important new applications of game theory have been discovered over the past 5 years in the context of research into the economics of information security. Many systems fail not ultimately for technical reasons but because incentives are wrong. For example, the people who guard a system often are not the people who suffer the full costs of failure, and as a result they make...
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In this paper we endogenize the point in time where an agent (and the principal) observe the realization of an additional signal: before the agent’s effort choice (ex ante information) or after (ex post information). We show that there is no difference between incentive and decision problems if the signal is uninformative about the agent’s effort: ex ante information is never worse and – if the...
متن کاملInformation and Incentives: The Agency Information Problem
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متن کاملInformation, incentives and multinational firms
Theoretical approaches to information and incentive problems in analyzing multinational firms’ behavior remain under-examined. I present a model that explains a multinational firm’s choice of organizational form of its intermediate goods production in the south, which includes FDI and outsourcing. In the case of outsourcing in the south, the multinational firm is faced with an adverse selection...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Policy Analysis and Management
سال: 1987
ISSN: 0276-8739
DOI: 10.2307/3323510