منابع مشابه
Pareto-optimal assignments by hierarchical exchange
Papai’s 2000 hierarchical exchange mechanisms for house allocation problems determine matchings as the outcome of multiple rounds of trading cycles. Any hierarchical exchange mechanism can be defined through a structure of ownership, which determines the ownership of houses after any round of trading cycles. Given a permutation of agents, a “permuted” hierarchical exchange mechanism can be cons...
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Selecting a set of alternatives based on the preferences of agents is an important problem in committee selection and beyond. Among the various criteria put forth for desirability of a committee, Pareto optimality is a minimal and important requirement. As asking agents to specify their preferences over exponentially many subsets of alternatives is practically infeasible, we assume that each ag...
متن کاملUsing Pareto Optimal Choice Sets
In behavioral experiments the respondents make their choices based on several factors called attributes. When the attributes are related to benefits and costs and respondents choose one attribute at a time, the highest level for benefit attributes and the lowest level for cost attributes will be selected. The relative importance given by the respondents to the attributes is not determined. If a...
متن کاملPareto Optimal Coordination on Roadmaps
Given a collection of robots sharing a common environment, assume that each possesses an individual roadmap for its C-space and a cost function for attaining a goal. Vector-valued (or Pareto) optima for collision-free coordination are by no means unique: in fact, continua of optimal coordinations are possible. However, for cylindrical obstacles (those defined by pairwise interactions), we prove...
متن کاملPareto Optimal Budgeted Combinatorial Auctions
This paper studies the possibility of implementing Pareto optimal outcomes in the combinatorial auction setting where bidders may have budget constraints. I show that when the setting involves a single good, or multiple goods but with single-minded bidders, there is a unique mechanism, called truncation VCG, that is individually rational, incentive compatible and Pareto optimal. Truncation VCG ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
سال: 2018
ISSN: 2167-8375,2167-8383
DOI: 10.1145/3105445