Primary Reasons as Normative Reasons

نویسندگان

چکیده

I argue that Davidson’s conception of motivating reasons as belief-desire pairs suggests a model normative for action is superior to the orthodox according which are propositions, facts, or truth-makers such facts.

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: The Journal of Philosophy

سال: 2021

ISSN: ['0022-362X', '1939-8549']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil202111828