Pricing would limit carbon rebound
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Congestion management using road pricing : Would it be efficient ?
A traffic simulation and assignment model is used to compute the social costs of congestion in five English towns, together with potential road charges. The social costs of congestion are measured by the deadweight loss and computed as the area between the marginal social cost and inverse demand curves between the actual and efficient levels of traffic. Potential road charges are computed as th...
متن کاملLimit pricing under third-degree price discrimination
We consider an incumbent who operates in two independent markets and has private information about his production cost. In one of the markets, there is a potential entrant o¤ering a di¤erentiated product. The most reasonable perfect bayesian equilibrium is either the least cost separating equilibrium or the pooling equilibrium where both types of incumbents set the low cost monopoly prices. The...
متن کاملOligopoly limit-pricing in the lab
We examine the behavior of senders and receivers in the context of oligopoly limit pricing experiments in which high prices chosen by two privately informed incumbents may signal to a potential entrant that the industry-wide costs are high and that entry is unprofitable. The results provide strong support for the theoretical prediction that the incumbents can credibly deter unprofitable entry w...
متن کاملCarbon pricing on the Russian electricity market
The paper examines the impact of pricing carbon emissions in the Russian electricity supply industry. We nd that emissions are reduced at any level of the carbon price. Most active fuel switching takes place at the carbon tax of 200...500 Roubles per tonne of CO2; but the e¤ect is uneven by zones. The social surplus turns out to be positive. A special case of a new interconnector "Ural Siberia...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Nature
سال: 2015
ISSN: 0028-0836,1476-4687
DOI: 10.1038/526195a