Pricing with bargain hunting consumers

نویسندگان

چکیده

A single-product retailer faces bargain hunting consumers whose willingness to pay incorporates sensations of gain and loss driven by differences between the observed price prices they rationally expect in spirit Koszegi Rabin (2006). We examine Bayesian Nash equilibrium (non-commitment) pricing solution which (i) maximizes profit given consumers' beliefs (ii) are consistent with retailer's choice. show two novel results: First, a pure-strategy, uniform-price, does not exist when hunters who value gains more than losses. Second, this case there exists mixed strategy all equilibria involve same profit. The is (weakly) lower absence reference effects.

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior

سال: 2021

ISSN: ['0899-8256', '1090-2473']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.06.011