Pricing-to-Market: Price Discrimination or Product Differentiation?
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Pricing-to-Market: Price Discrimination or Product Differentiation?∗
We employ a vertical differentiation model to examine the potential bias in pricing-to-market (PTM) results when using unit values aggregating differentiated products. Our results show that: i) false evidence of PTM (“pseudo PTM”) is always found when using unit values, whether the law of one price holds or not; and ii) the extent to which results are biased due to pseudo PTM increases with the...
متن کاملPricing-to-market: Price Discrimination
We employ a vertical differentiation model to examine the potential bias in pricing-to-market results when using export unit values aggregating differentiated products. Our results show that: (i) false evidence of pricing-to-market is always found when using unit values, whether the law of one price holds or not; and (ii) the size of the bias increases with the level of product differentiation....
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The existing literaturewhich analyses the relationship between the product differentiation degree and the sustainability of a collusive agreement on price assumes that firms cannot price discriminate, and concludes that there is a negative relationship between the product differentiation degree and the critical discount factor. This paper, in contrast, assumes that firms are able to price discr...
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a r t i c l e i n f o Mixed bundling (MB), in which products are sold separately and as a bundle, is a form of second degree price discrimination. In this study we examine how MB and its variants compare against reserved product pricing (RPP), a form of co-promotion. Used by Amazon.com, among others, RPP consists of the firm offering individual products and then enticing single product buyers w...
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We consider an incumbent who operates in two independent markets and has private information about his production cost. In one of the markets, there is a potential entrant o¤ering a di¤erentiated product. The most reasonable perfect bayesian equilibrium is either the least cost separating equilibrium or the pooling equilibrium where both types of incumbents set the low cost monopoly prices. The...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2006
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.622986