Pricing policies for selling indivisible storable goods to strategic consumers

Contingent Preannounced Pricing Policies with Strategic Consumers

Strategic Pricing when Electricity is Storable

In this paper, we develop a dynamic Bertrand model of competition among hydroelectric (hydro) generators. Unlike other competitors in electricity generation markets, hydro generators’ current pricing decisions affect their future productive capacity through their impact on available water reserves. Our model assumes that each player uses a Markov strategy based on the current state of water res...

Strategic Behaviour When Allocating Indivisible Goods

We survey some recent research regarding strategic behaviour in resource allocation problems, focusing on the fair division of indivisible goods. We consider a number of computational questions like how a single strategic agent misreports their preferences to ensure a particular outcome, and how agents compute a Nash equilibrium when they all act strategically. We also identify a number of futu...

Strategic Behavior when Allocating Indivisible Goods

We study a simple sequential allocation mechanism for allocating indivisible goods between agents in which agents take turns to pick items. We focus on agents behaving strategically. We view the allocation procedure as a finite repeated game with perfect information. We show that with just two agents, we can compute the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in linear time. With more agents, c...

Strategic Behavior in a Decentralized Protocol for Allocating Indivisible Goods

We study in detail a simple sequential procedure for allocating a set of indivisible goods to multiple agents. Agents take turns to pick items according to a policy. For example, in the alternating policy, agents simply alternate who picks the next item. A similar procedure has been used by Harvard Business School to allocate courses to students. We study here the impact of strategic behavior o...