Pricing in transportation networks

Pricing of Geometric Transportation Networks

We propose algorithms for pricing a transportation network in such a way that the profit generated by the customers is maximized. We model the transportation network as a subset of the plane and take into account the fact that the customers minimize their own transportation cost. The underlying theory is a two-player game model called Stackelberg games. We propose algorithms for the cases where...

Pricing, Capacity Choice, and Financing in Transportation Networks*

This paper explores interrelations between pricing, capacity choice, and financing in transportation networks. We build on the Mohring-Harwitz result on self-financing of optimally designed and priced roads and investigate it in a network environment under various types of second-best regulation. A small network model with endogenous car ownership demonstrates that optimal congestion pricing an...

Equilibrium, Games, and Pricing in Transportation and Telecommunication Networks

Network equilibrium models that have traditionally been used for transportation planning have penetrated in recent years to other scientific fields. These models have recently been introduced in the telecommunication networks literature, as well as in the field of game theory. Researchers in the latter fields are not always aware of the very rich literature on equilibrium models outside of thei...

Equilibrium, Games, and Pricing in Transportation and Telecommunications Networks

Second-best Congestion Pricing in General Static Transportation Networks with Elastic Demands

This paper studies the second-best problem where not all links of a congested transportation network can be tolled. The second-best tax rule for this problem is derived for general static networks, so that the solution presented is valid for any graph of the network, and for any set of tolling points available on that network. It is demonstrated that the solution obtained indeed generalizes a n...