Pricing for the Optimal Coordination of Opportunistic Agents
نویسندگان
چکیده
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems
سال: 2018
ISSN: 2325-5870,2372-2533
DOI: 10.1109/tcns.2017.2648503