Pricing for a Durable-Goods Monopolist Under Rapid Sequential Innovation
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Pricing for a Durable-Goods Monopolist Under Rapid Sequential Innovation
Adurable-goods monopolist who will be introducing new and improved versions of his product must decide how to price his products, keeping in mind the relative attractiveness of the current and future products. Dhebar (1994) has shown that if technology is changing too quickly and the producer cannot credibly commit to future prices and quality, then no equilibrium strategy exists. That is, ther...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Management Science
سال: 2001
ISSN: 0025-1909,1526-5501
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.47.11.1552.10247