Pricing Equilibria and Graphical Valuations
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
سال: 2018
ISSN: 2167-8375,2167-8383
DOI: 10.1145/3175495