Pricing decisions during panic buying and its effect on a dual-channel supply chain under different channel power structures

Uncertain future and fears about the stock-outs will compel customers to stock goods at home, resulting in panic buying. Even though it is a frequently observed consumer behaviour, there scant literature dual-channel supply chain (DCSC) which address this demand disruption. This study analytically models analyses impact of buying DCSC. For that we consider two-echelon comprising manufacturer, brick mortar store (r-store), online (e-store). The interaction between upstream downstream channel members modelled using Stackelberg game. Further, examined two based on power difference r-store e-store, i.e., (i) leader model (ii) e-store model. We also used Monte-Carlo simulation deduce corollaries managerial insights. found Law doesn’t hold during disruption, even essential act like Veblen period. Contrary expectation, was be beneficial for e-store. Counter-intuitive results with respect were obtained sense operate under leadership vice versa. shows manufacturer better off