Pricing and Sales Effort Decisions in a Closed-Loop Supply Chain Considering the Network Externality of Remanufactured Product

Considering the network externality of remanufactured product, this paper develops Stackelberg game models in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) consisting an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and retailer with dual sales channel under three scenarios, i.e., no effort (Model N), exerting R) OEM M). The study investigates pricing decisions for CLSC members. results show that: (1) Compared effort, behavior can always improve profits entire CLSC. retailer’s profit be improved Model R, so could cause loss promote products further cannibalize new product market. (2) M is more favorable to CLSC, while prefers R. beneficial boosting products. (3) As externality/consumer’s sensitivity becomes obvious, members exert exerts compared retailer. (4) Only when cost much lower than it that obtain effort; then, win-win situation between achieved.