Price Stability and Central Bank Independence: Discipline, Credibility, and Democratic Institutions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
assessing political stability and instability in central asia and caucasus; case study, azerbaijan and kyrgyzstan
منطقه ی آسیای مرکزی وقفقاز به عنوان منطقه ای تاریخی و به دلیل دارا بودن ذخایر عظیم هیدرو کربنی از اهمیت ویژه ای برخوردار است. کشورهای این منطقه از عوامل عمده ی بی ثباتی نظیر عوامل جغرافیایی، اقتصادی، امنیتی، اجتماعی و سیاسی رنج می برند. پس از فروپاشی اتحاد جماهیر شوروی کشورهای منطقه از نعمت استقلال ناخواسته ای برخوردار شدند که مشکلات فوق را برای آن ها چندین برابر می کرد. در این روند برخی از این...
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New monetary literatures widely concentrates on the importance of institutional arrangements in the effectiveness of monetary policy. The debate regarding the optimal institutional design of central banks, independence and conservatism are usually considered to be the most important ingredients for a stable and successful monetary policy. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to deal with the...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Organization
سال: 2014
ISSN: 0020-8183,1531-5088
DOI: 10.1017/s0020818314000277