منابع مشابه
Tacit Collusion and Capacity Withholding in Repeated Uniform Price Auctions∗
This paper contributes to the study of tacit collusion by analyzing infinitely repeated multiunit uniform price auctions in a symmetric oligopoly with capacity constrained firms. Under both the Market Clearing and Maximum Accepted Price rules of determining the uniform price, we show that when each firm sets a price-quantity pair specifying the firm’s minimum acceptable price and the maximum qu...
متن کاملText Message Price Gouging: A Perfect Storm of Tacit Collusion
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... 217 I. TEXT MESSAGE PRICING ......................................................... 218 A. History of Text Message Pricing ............................................ 218 B. Text Messaging Price Comparison ......................................... 220 II. TEXT MESSAGING MARKET BACKGROUND ...........
متن کاملTacit Collusion in Oligopoly∗
We examine the economics literature on tacit collusion in oligopoly markets and take steps toward clarifying the relation between economists’ analysis of tacit collusion and those in the legal literature. We provide an example to motivate the idea that collusive profits can be achieved via tacit coordination in an environment where there is a unique, salient way for colluders to maximize and di...
متن کاملTacit collusion in repeated auctions
This paper considers the question of tacit collusion in repeated auctions with independent private values and with limited public monitoring. McAfee and McMillan show that the extent of collusion is tied to availability of transfers. Monetary transfers allow cartels to extract full surplus. A folk theorem proved by Fudenberg at al. shows that transfers of future payoffs are almost as good if pl...
متن کاملModeling Tacit Collusion in Auctions
We study tacit collusion in repeated auctions in which bidders can only observe past winners and not their bids. We adopt a stringent interpretation of tacit collusion as collusion without communication about strategies that we model as a symmetry restriction on repeated game strategies: Strategies cannot discriminate among initially nameless bidders until they have become named through winning...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economics Letters
سال: 2003
ISSN: 0165-1765
DOI: 10.1016/s0165-1765(02)00208-2