Price of anarchy for non-atomic congestion games with stochastic demands
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Price of Anarchy for Non-atomic Congestion Games with Stochastic Demands
We generalize the notions of user equilibrium and system optimum to nonatomic congestion games with stochastic demands. We establish upper bounds on the price of anarchy for three different settings of link cost functions and demand distributions, namely, (a) affine cost functions and general distributions, (b) polynomial cost functions and general positive-valued distributions, and (c) polynom...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Transportation Research Part B: Methodological
سال: 2014
ISSN: 0191-2615
DOI: 10.1016/j.trb.2014.08.009