Price Competition with Consumer Confusion
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Price Competition with Consumer Confusion
This paper proposes a model in which identical sellers of a homogenous product compete in both prices and price frames (i.e., ways to present price information). We model price framing by assuming that firms’ frame choices affect the comparability of their price offers: consumers may fail to compare prices due to frame differentiation, and due to frame complexity. In the symmetric equilibrium t...
متن کاملPrice Competition and Consumer Confusion
This paper proposes a model in which identical sellers of a homogenous product compete in both prices and price frames (i.e., ways to present price information). We model price framing by assuming that firms’ frame choices affect the comparability of their price offers: consumers may fail to compare prices due to frame differentiation, and due to frame complexity. In the symmetric equilibrium t...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Management Science
سال: 2013
ISSN: 0025-1909,1526-5501
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2013.1716