Price Competition and Product Differentiation when Goods have Network Effects
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: German Economic Review
سال: 2006
ISSN: 1468-0475,1465-6485
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0475.2006.00159.x