Price Commitments in Standard Setting Under Asymmetric Information
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Competitive Price and Quality under Asymmetric Information
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Proof of Theorem 4. For wa ∈ [c + ck, rck w−c ], we have the boundary equilibrium. From its definition, yb(ξ) is decreasing in wa (that is, dyb(ξ) dwa < 0) and yb(ξ) = μ + ξ + G−1( r−c−ck r ) when wa = c + ck. The total supply chain profit at the boundary equilibrium is Πtot(yb(ξ), yb(ξ), ξ) = rEmin(μ + ξ + , yb(ξ)) − (c + ck)y(ξ) from Equations (16) and (17). This function is concave and incre...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2019
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3356605