منابع مشابه
Price Adjustment at Multiproduct Retailers
We empirically study the price adjustment process at multiproduct retail stores. We use a unique store level data set for five large supermarket and one drugstore chains in the USA, to document the exact process required to change prices. Our data set allows us to study this process in great detail, describing the exact procedure, stages, and steps undertaken during the price change process. We...
متن کاملPrice Promotions and Trade Deals with Multiproduct Retailers
n this paper we study retail price promotions and manufacturer trade deals in markets with multiproduct retailers. We find that in situations where retailers carry more than one competing brand, the promotions across brands can be positively or negatively correlated depending on the structure of the market: the relative sizes of the various market segments (in terms of loyalty to manufacturer, ...
متن کاملMenu Costs, Posted Prices, and Multiproduct Retailers*
We use a unique store-level data set to directly measure menu costs and to study the price change process at a large U.S. drugstore chain. We compare and contrast the magnitude of these measures with similar measures from 4 large U.S. supermarket chains. We find that (1) the actual magnitude of menu costs as a share of revenues, (2) menu costs per price change, (3) the frequent use of promotion...
متن کاملPrice Dispersion Within and Across Retailers at a Comparison Site
Price data from comparison sites are easy to obtain from the internet, providing ample opportunities to analyze theories on price dispersion empirically. We propose a generalized analytical model that generates heterogenous mixed pricing strategies. Making seller service ratings public on comparison site leads to price di¤erence because of vertical product di¤erentiation. Furthermore, we show t...
متن کاملPrice and non - price restraints when retailers are vertically differentiated
This paper considers vertical restraints in the context of an intrabrand competition model in which a single manufacturer deals with two vertically differentiated retailers. We establish two main results. First, if the market cannot be vertically segmented, the manufacturer will foreclose the low quality retailer either directly by dealing exclusively with the high quality retailer, or indirect...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Managerial and Decision Economics
سال: 1998
ISSN: 0143-6570,1099-1468
DOI: 10.1002/(sici)1099-1468(199803)19:2<81::aid-mde867>3.3.co;2-n