Prevention incentives in long-term insurance contracts
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Can Incentives for Long-term Care Insurance Reduce Medicaid Spending?
The prospect of paying for nursing home care represents a significant financial risk for older Americans. Despite this risk, few individuals buy long-term care insurance and, since many lack the resources to pay out of pocket, they often turn to the means-tested Medicaid program. Concerned about growing Medicaid costs, many states have initiated “partnership” programs that offer a unique incent...
متن کاملControlling selection incentives when health insurance contracts are endogenous
The paper examines the nature of health insurance contracts when insurance companies pool highand low-risk individuals. In a spatial product differentiation model, the normal forces of competition induce quality provision, but selection incentives induce insurers to under-provide quality. To offset selection incentives, the government can reimburse some of the insurers’ costs. However, such a s...
متن کاملLong term care insurance.
Long term care is a relatively new employee benefit issue and was virtually unheard of two years ago. Long term care plans have been implemented in a handful of companies and government retirement systems. Long term care has become an employee benefits issue because of the growing awareness of the risks of long term care to the elderly and the costs of long term care. Long term care benefit pla...
متن کاملAuctioning Long-term Gas Contracts in Colombia
This paper presents an approach to auctioning long-term gas contracts in Colombia. I propose an annual auction for long-term firm gas contracts. The auction would assign and price all firm gas contracts, with the exception of gas from the Guajira field, which is assigned administratively at a regulated price. The proposal is a partial market design in that it does not address the transportation...
متن کاملInterim Information in Long Term Contracts
This paper studies the effectiveness of interim information in reducing inefficiencies in long term relationships. If the interim information is verifiable, it resolves all problems of asymmetric information. Under nonverifiability, the information alleviates the contracting problem only partially and its optimal use depends on the signal’s accuracy and timing. Precise and early signals enable ...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
سال: 2017
ISSN: 1058-6407
DOI: 10.1111/jems.12196