Presidents, Policy Compromise, and Legislative Success

Policy Dynamics and Legislative Bargaining

This paper presents a dynamic model of legislative bargaining with an evolving default policy. We show that even with a fixed proposer proposal power is limited in equilibrium. Moreover, legislators have induced preferences over the distribution of benefits. We then apply the model to entitlement policies and models of public good production. Our results provide an explanation for the "ratchet ...

Dynamic legislative policy making

We prove existence of stationary Markov perfect equilibria in an infinite-horizon model of legislative policy making in which the policy outcome in one period determines the status quo in the next. We allow for a multidimensional policy space and arbitrary smooth stage utilities. We prove that all such equilibria are essentially in pure strategies and that proposal strategies are differentiable...

Supplemental Materials for “Presidents and Parties: How Presidential Elections Shape Coordination in Legislative Elections”

1.1 Case Selection Criteria and Presidentialism We elaborate on each of our case selection criteria in turn. First, the explanation for our chosen time period is straightforward. We saw no reason to not broaden our coverage both forwards and backwards in time relative to the literature, provided the appropriate data were available. This ensured that our presidential regime-only models would hav...

Genetic information and the workplace: legislative approaches and policy changes.

“In the employment setting, discrimina­ tion among individuals has long been legal­ ly, ethically, and socially acceptable” (1). Employers may select prospective employees on the basis of their past experience or their education but are prohibited from selecting employees on the basis of specific categories such as age, color, and ethnic origin (1). Now there are numerous reasons for employ­ er...

Presidents, Vice Presidents, and Death: Closing the Constitution's Succession Gap