Presidents, Parties, and Policy Competition

Presidents, Prime Ministers, Parties, and Mandate-Representatio

How does presidentialism affect democratic representation, both in theory and in practice? In this paper, part of a larger book project, we build on our previous research (Samuels and Shugart 2003), which argued that all else equal, presidentialism impedes representation based on prospective government “mandates.” Inspired by and building on research on Latin America by Susan Stokes (2001), her...

Policy-Motivated Parties in Dynamic Political Competition

We analyze a model of a dynamic political competition between two policy-motivated parties under uncertainty. The model suggests that electoral mandates matter: increasing the margin of victory in the previous election causes both parties to shift towards policies preferred by the winner, and the loser typically shifts more than the winner. The model also provides potential answers to a number ...

Presidents, Parties, and the Business Cycle, 19492009

Scattered works by political scientists since the 1970s have reported that Democratic presidents have compiled stronger economic records than their Republican counterparts: economic growth has been higher, unemployment lower, and inequality has fallen during Democratic administrations while the opposite outcomes have occurred under Republican presidents. Recently, however, Campbell has vigorous...

Presidents and Parties in Regional Politics : Italy and Spain Compared

Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy *

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