Presentists Should Not Believe in Time Travel
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Kagaku tetsugaku
سال: 2021
ISSN: 0289-3428,1883-6461
DOI: 10.4216/jpssj.53.2_191