Preferences or blocs? Voting in the United Nations Human Rights Council

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چکیده

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: The Review of International Organizations

سال: 2013

ISSN: 1559-7431,1559-744X

DOI: 10.1007/s11558-013-9172-2