منابع مشابه
Price Competition and Consumer Confusion
This paper proposes a model in which identical sellers of a homogenous product compete in both prices and price frames (i.e., ways to present price information). We model price framing by assuming that firms’ frame choices affect the comparability of their price offers: consumers may fail to compare prices due to frame differentiation, and due to frame complexity. In the symmetric equilibrium t...
متن کاملPrice Competition with Consumer Confusion
This paper proposes a model in which identical sellers of a homogenous product compete in both prices and price frames (i.e., ways to present price information). We model price framing by assuming that firms’ frame choices affect the comparability of their price offers: consumers may fail to compare prices due to frame differentiation, and due to frame complexity. In the symmetric equilibrium t...
متن کاملSocial Preferences and Competition
There is a general presumption that social preferences can be ignored if markets are competitive. Market experiments (Smith 1962) and recent theoretical results (Dufwenberg et al. 2008) suggest that competition forces people to behave as if they were purely selfinterested. We qualify this view. Social preferences are irrelevant if and only if two conditions are met: separability of preferences ...
متن کاملDo Government Preferences Matter for Tax Competition?
This paper explores how government preferences affect the choices of capital tax rates in the presence of tax competition. We develop a model in which governments, differentiating in their preferences for economic development and regional equality, compete for mobile capital over corporation taxes. The key prediction of the model, borne out in data from OECD countries over the years 1990-2007, ...
متن کاملManagerial Preferences and Competition in Internal Capital Markets
It is often argued that managers follow some preference function. The internal capital market literature, for example, most commonly treats managers as empire builders who receive increased private bene ts from having more funds under their control. However, recent empirical work (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2003), shows that some managers might prefer to be left to run a limited number of projec...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2020
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3592445