منابع مشابه
Normative and non-normative concepts: Paternalism and libertarian paternalism
This chapter concerns the normativity of the concepts of paternalism and libertarian paternalism. The first concept is central to evaluation of public health policy, but its meaning is controversial. The second concept is equally controversial and has received much attention recently. It may or may not shape the future evaluation of public health policy. In order to facilitate honest and fruitf...
متن کاملWelfare and Paternalism
Citizens’ desires to assist the poor reflect a mixture of insurance motives, altruism, and paternalism. Consequently, government policies toward the poor have always been a mixture of income supports and regulations of recipient behavior. Unfortunately, there have been very few analyses of the how these distinct motives interact to generate various policies to the poor. In this paper, we develo...
متن کاملOptimal Paternalism∗
If one accepts some paternalistic objectives, how should this shape policy? This paper addresses this issue by considering the trade-off that results when agents have superior information regarding their own situation and tastes but a paternalistic principal views agents’ tastes as as being biased. Applications include: savings behavior by hyperbolic discounting consumers, schooling choice by t...
متن کاملTax policy and present-biased preferences: Paternalism under international capital mobility ¬リニ
This paper deals with tax-policy responses to quasi-hyperbolic discounting. Earlier research on optimal paternalism typically abstracts from capital mobility. If capital is mobile between countries, it may no longer be possible for national governments to control domestic savings via capital taxation (as in a closed economy). In this paper, we take a broad perspective on public policy responses...
متن کاملOverconfidence, Insurance and Paternalism
It is well known that when agents are fully rational, compulsory public insurance may make all agents better o¤ in the Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) model of insurance markets. We nd that when su¢ ciently many agents underestimate their personal risks, compulsory insurance makes low-risk agents worse o¤. Hence, behavioral biases may weaken some of the well-established rationales for governmen...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Political Theory
سال: 2005
ISSN: 0090-5917,1552-7476
DOI: 10.1177/0090591704272351