Preference Variation in Volunteering Decisions: Public Goods and Private Benefits

Phase transitions and volunteering in spatial public goods games.

We present a simple yet effective mechanism promoting cooperation under full anonymity by allowing for voluntary participation in public goods games. This natural extension leads to "rock-scissors-paper"-type cyclic dominance of the three strategies, cooperate, defect, and loner. In spatial settings with players arranged on a regular lattice, this results in interesting dynamical properties and...

Public Supply of Private Goods

Public Provision of Private Goods

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Educational Context and ELT Teachers’ Corrective Feedback Preference: Public and Private School Teachers in Focus

This study investigated the possible relationship between educational context and English Language Teaching (ELT) teachers’ corrective feedback preference. To this end, 42 Iranian EEFL teachers from some private language institutes and 39 Iranian EFL teachers from different schools in Shiraz, Iran participated in the study. The Questionnaire for Corrective Feedback Approaches (QCFAs) was ...

Benefits of tolerance in public goods games

Leaving the joint enterprise when defection is unveiled is always a viable option to avoid being exploited. Although loner strategy helps the population not to be trapped into the tragedy of the commons state, it could offer only a modest income for nonparticipants. In this paper we demonstrate that showing some tolerance toward defectors could not only save cooperation in harsh environments bu...