Predicting human behavior in unrepeated, simultaneous-move games

Predicting human behavior in unrepeated, simultaneous-move games

It is common to assume that agents will adopt Nash equilibrium strategies; however, experimental studies have demonstrated that Nash equilibrium is often a poor description of human players’ behavior in unrepeated normal-form games. In this paper, we analyze five widely studied models (QRE, Lk, Cognitive Hierarchy, QLk, and Noisy Introspection) that aim to describe actual, rather than idealized...

Evaluating, Understanding, and Improving Behavioral Game Theory Models For Predicting Human Behavior in Unrepeated Normal-Form Games

It is common to assume that agents will adopt Nash equilibrium strategies; however, experimental studies have demonstrated that Nash equilibrium is often a poor description of human players’ behavior in unrepeated normal-form games. In this paper, we analyze four widely studied models (QRE, Lk, Cognitive Hierarchy, QLk) that aim to describe actual, rather than idealized, human behavior. We perf...

Common Knowledge in Simultaneous-Move Games

Econ 618 Simultaneous Move Bayesian Games

A game of incomplete information or a Bayesian game is a game in which players do not have full information about each others payoffs. In a strategic situation where a player’s payoff depends on what actions his rivals will take, this poses a problem because a player does not know which game is being played. There are several reasons why players may not have full information about each others’p...

Algorithms for computing strategies in two-player simultaneous move games

Simultaneous move games model discrete, multistage interactions where at each stage players simultaneously choose their actions. At each stage, a player does not know what action the other player will take, but otherwise knows the full state of the game. This formalism has been used to express games in general game playing and can also model many discrete approximations of real-world scenarios....