Predation Under Perfect Information
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Subgame-perfect Implementation under Information Perturbations*
We consider the robustness of extensive form mechanisms to deviations from common knowledge about the state of nature, which we refer to as information perturbations. First, we show that even under arbitrarily small information perturbations the Moore-Repullo mechanism does not yield (even approximately) truthful revelation and that in addition the mechanism has sequential equilibria with undes...
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In this paper we conduct a laboratory experiment to test the extent to which Moore and Repullo’s subgame perfect implementation mechanism induces truth-telling in practice, both in a setting with perfect information and in a setting where buyers and sellers face a small amount of uncertainty regarding the good’s value. We find that Moore-Repullo mechanisms fail to implement truth-telling in a s...
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The theory of incomplete contracts has been recently questioned using or extending the subgame perfect implementation approach of Moore and Repullo (1988). We consider the robustness of this mechanism to the introduction of small amounts of asymmetric information. Our main result is that the mechanism may not yield (even approximately) truthful revelation as the amount of asymmetric information...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2010
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1569493