Precedent transfer in coordination games: An experiment
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Increasing Cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemmas by Establishing a Precedent of Efficiency in Coordination Games.
Coordination games have multiple Nash equilibria (i.e., sets of strategies which are best responses to one another). In weak-link coordination games players choose a number 1-7. Their payoff is increasing in the minimum number (or weakest link) and decreasing in the difference between their number and the minimum. Choosing 7 is an efficient equilibrium because it gives everybody a higher payoff...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economics Letters
سال: 2005
ISSN: 0165-1765
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2005.05.038