Practical Related-Key Forgery Attacks on Full-Round TinyJAMBU-192/256

TinyJAMBU is one of the finalists in NIST lightweight cryptography competition. It considered to be more efficient ciphers competition and has undergone extensive analysis recent years as both keyed permutation well mode are new designs. In this paper we present a related-key forgery attack on updated TinyJAMBU-v2 scheme with 256- 192-bit keys. We introduce high probability differential where differences only introduced into key state. Therefore, characteristic applicable can used mount attack. The time data complexity 233 using 214 related-keys for 256-bit version, 243 216 version.For 128-bit construct full 2−16. extend relatedkey characteristics practical-time key-recovery attacks that extract from 224, 221, 219 respectively 128-, 192-, variants.All experimentally verified provide nonce pairs produce same tag show feasibility note designers do not claim security, however, proposed suggest key-commiting, which been recently identified favorable property AEAD schemes.