Practical reasoning and practical knowledge

Knowledge, Practical Reasoning And Action

Is knowledge necessary or sufficient or both necessary and sufficient for acceptable practical reasoning and rational action? Several authors (e.g., Williamson, Hawthorne, and Stanley) have recently argued that the answer to these questions is positive. In this paper I present several objections against this view (both in its basic form as well in more developed forms). I also offer a sketch of...

Knowledge and Reasoning in Practical Dialogue Systems

We describe Scusi?, a spoken language interpretationmechanism designed to be part of a robot-mounted di-alogue system. Scusi?’s interpretation process mapsspoken utterances to text, which in turn is parsed andthen converted to conceptual graphs. In order to sup-port robust and flexible performance of the dialoguemodule, Scusi? maintains multiple options at eachstage ...

Practical Reasoning and Rationality

Practical reasoning and enkrasia

Akrasia has been traditionally defined as a failure to do what one has most reasons to do, or what one judges that one ought to do (McIntyre 2006; Wedgwood 2007). Traditional conceptions on akrasia take it as a violation of a commitment of the agent: “[for traditional conceptions] an agent who decisively judges it best to A is thereby rationally committed to A-ing, in the sense that (as long as...

Graph Based Knowledge Representation and Reasoning: Practical AI Applications

This paper presents a graph-based knowledge representation and reasoning language. This language benefits from an important syntactic operation, which is called a graph homomorphism. This operation is sound and complete with respect to logical deduction. Hence, it is possible to do logical reasoning without using the language of logic but only graphical, thus visual, notions. This paper present...