Practical reasoning and degrees of outright belief
نویسندگان
چکیده
Abstract According to a suggestion by Williamson (Knowledge and its limits, Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 99), outright belief comes in degrees: one has high/low degree of iff is willing rely on the content one’s high/low-stakes practical reasoning. This paper develops an epistemic norm for degrees so construed. Starting from assumption that aims at knowledge, it argued aim various levels strong knowledge , is, which satisfies particularly high standards. account contrasted with shown be superior alternative proposal according higher higher-order knowledge. In “Appendix”, indicated logic closely linked ranking theory .
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Synthese
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['0039-7857', '1573-0964']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03153-0