Power sharing and electoral equilibrium

Political motivations and electoral competition: Equilibrium analysis and experimental evidence

We study both theoretically and experimentally the set of Nash equilibria of a classical one-dimensional election game with two candidates. These candidates are interested in power and ideology, but their weights on these two motives are not necessarily identical. Apart from obtaining the well known median voter result and the two-sided policy differentiation outcome, the paper uncovers the exi...

a study of relationship between knowledge sharing and organizational agility among personnel in esfahan power electric distribution company

پژوهش حاضر به بررسی رابطه بین تسهیم دانش و چابکی سازمانی در شرکت توزیع برق استان اصفهان پرداخته است . ابزار سنجش در این پژوهش پرسشنامه می باشد . به منظور سنجش متغیر تسهیم دانش از پرسشنامه وانگ و وانگ و جهت سنجش چابکی سازمانی از پرسشنامه چاربونیر استفاده شده است . هدف پژوهش حاضر تحلیل رابطه میان تسهیم دانش و چابکی سازمانی از دید کارکنان شرکت توزیع برق استان اصفهان می باشد . جامعه آماری این پژوه...

Mixed Strategy Equilibrium and Deep Covering in Multidimensional Electoral Competition

We prove existence of mixed strategy electoral equilibrium in the multidimensional Downsian model of elections. We do so by modelling voters explicitly as players, enabling us to resolve discontinuities in the game between the candidates, which have proved a barrier to existence. We then give a partial characterization: the supports of equilibrium mixed strategies must lie in the deep uncovered...

Equilibrium in risk-sharing games

Strategic Outsourcing , Profit Sharing and Equilibrium Unemployment

We analyze the following questions under imperfect labour markets. How does strategic outsourcing influence wage formation, profit sharing and employee effort when firms commit to optimal profit sharing before wage formation or decide for profit sharing after wage formation? What is the relationship between outsourcing, profit sharing, and equilibrium unemployment? We find that in both scenario...