Power indices and the veil of ignorance
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Power indices and the veil of ignorance
We provide an axiomatic foundation of the expected utility preferences over lotteries on roles in simple superadditive games represented by the two main power indices, the Shapley-Shubik index and the Banzhaf index, when they are interpreted as von NeumannMorgenstern utility functions. Our axioms admit meaningful interpretations in the setting proposed by Roth in terms of di®erent attitudes tow...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Game Theory
سال: 2003
ISSN: 0020-7276,1432-1270
DOI: 10.1007/s001820200121