Power in the Firm and Managerial Career Concerns
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economics <html_ent glyph="@amp;" ascii="&"/> Management Strategy
سال: 2003
ISSN: 1058-6407,1530-9134
DOI: 10.1111/j.1430-9134.2003.00001.x