Power against random expenditure allocation for revealed preference tests
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Power Indices for Revealed Preference Tests
Revealed preference tests are elegant nonparametric tools that ask whether individual or aggregate data conform to economic models of optimizing behavior. In designing a test using revealed preference, however, one faces a vexing tension between goodness-of- t and power. If the test nds violations, then one must ask if the test was too demanding is there an acceptable tolerance for goodness-o...
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Revealed preference tests are elegant nonparametric tools that ask whether choice data conforms to optimizing behavior. These tests present a vexing tension between goodness-of-fit and power. If the test finds violations, is there an acceptable tolerance for goodness-of-fit? If no violations are found, was the test demanding enough to be powerful? This paper complements the many on goodness-of-...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
سال: 2021
ISSN: 0167-2681
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.05.001