Posted Price Clauses in Ascending Auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Posted price selling and online auctions
a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t JEL classification: C70 D44 D61 Keywords: Online auctions Posted price selling Buy-it-now Allocative inefficiency Random matching eBay auctions In an auction-style listing at eBay, sellers have the option to set a posted price (also known as buy-it-now price), which allows buyers to instantly purchase an item before the start of the auction. This paper prov...
متن کاملCollusion in private value ascending price auctions
We investigate the effects of bid improvement rules and bidder value asymmetry on bidder collusion in experimental ascending price auctions without communication. We find that the strict bid improvement rule and private values are not always sufficient to break collusion among well-motivated bidders. Collusion still occurs as long as bidder gains from collusion are high. JEL classification code...
متن کاملLearning the demand curve in posted-price digital goods auctions
Online digital goods auctions are settings where a seller with an unlimited supply of goods (e.g. music or movie downloads) interacts with a stream of potential buyers. In the posted price setting, the seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to each arriving buyer. We study the seller’s revenue maximization problem in posted-price auctions of digital goods. We find that algorithms from the mul...
متن کاملOptimal Regret Minimization in Posted-Price Auctions with Strategic Buyers
We study revenue optimization learning algorithms for posted-price auctions with strategic buyers. We analyze a very broad family of monotone regret minimization algorithms for this problem, which includes the previously best known algorithm, and show that no algorithm in that family admits a strategic regret more favorable than Ω( √ T ). We then introduce a new algorithm that achieves a strate...
متن کاملRevenue Optimization in Posted-Price Auctions with Strategic Buyers
We study revenue optimization learning algorithms for posted-price auctions with strategic buyers. We analyze a very broad family of monotone regret minimization algorithms for this problem, which includes the previously best known algorithm, and show that no algorithm in that family admits a strategic regret more favorable than Ω( √ T ). We then introduce a new algorithm that achieves a strate...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2003
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.415942