Population Monotonicity in Public Good Economies with Single Dipped Preferences
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Coalitional Strategy-Proofness in Economies with Single-Dipped Preferences and the Assignment of an Indivisible Object
We study two allocation models. In the first model, we consider the problem of allocating an infinitely divisible commodity among agents with single-dipped preferences. In the second model, a degenerate case of the first one, we study the allocation of an indivisible object to a group of agents. Our main result is the characterization of the class of Pareto optimal and coalitionally strategy-pr...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Economics and Finance
سال: 2016
ISSN: 1916-9728,1916-971X
DOI: 10.5539/ijef.v8n4p80