Pooling, pricing and trading of risks

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Pooling, pricing and trading of risks

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Annals of Operations Research

سال: 2008

ISSN: 0254-5330,1572-9338

DOI: 10.1007/s10479-007-0305-y