Pollution, shadow economy and corruption: Theory and evidence
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Corruption and the Shadow Economy
This paper develops a simple framework to analyze the links between corruption and the unofficial economy and their implications for the official economy. In a model of self-selection with heterogeneous entrepreneurs, we show that the entrepreneurs’ option to flee to the underground economy constrains a corrupt official’s ability to introduce distortions to the economy for private gains. The un...
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Corruption and the Shadow Economy: An Empirical Analysis This paper analyzes the influence of the shadow economy on corruption and vice versa. We hypothesize that corruption and shadow economy are substitutes in high income countries while they are complements in low income countries. The hypotheses are tested for a crosssection of 120 countries and a panel of 70 countries for the period 1994-2...
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The aim of this paper is to study the relationship between the shadow economy and corruption as determinants of public debt in the Spanish Autonomous Communities. In addition, we construct a Corruption Perception Index for those regions. Our data constitute panel data for the period 2000–2012. The results show that the volume of the shadow economy has a significant and positive impact on region...
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Using objective micro-level data on tunneling for the population of large Russian firms, we document pervasive corruption in public procurement. Corruption exhibits political cycle: firms with procurement revenue provide shadow financing for regional elections. Using variation in quality of tax inspectors as a source of variation in tunneling, we show that political connections are not the only...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Ecological Economics
سال: 2012
ISSN: 0921-8009
DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2012.01.007